TABLE 20

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Total (Net)</th>
<th>German lending to foreigners (increase —)</th>
<th>Foreign lending to residents (increase +)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>Enterprises and Individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
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<td>0.3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>+1.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>+1.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>+0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>+0.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>+0.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
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TABLE 21

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Total (Net)</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Official</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td>Enterprises and Liabilities</td>
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<td>1956</td>
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<td>1964</td>
<td>+0.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
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</table>

Godley's Law, Godley's Rule
and the 'New Cambridge Macroeconomics'**

Since the end of World War II, the United Kingdom's macroeconomic policies have been dominated by the attempt to control aggregate demand within rather narrow limits. Typically the instruments the authorities have utilised for this purpose have been fiscal rather than monetary. As a consequence Britain has undergone increasingly frequent revisions of government expenditure policies and tax functions, culminating in something of a fiscal frenzy during the last few years. In short discretionary changes in major fiscal instruments have been made increasingly frequently with the proximate aim of managing aggregate demand. Without pretending to complete precision we may argue that the purpose of the authorities has been to "fine tune" the economy and that, in pursuing this technique, having regard to the typical costs of taking decisions, they have shown themselves to be confident of their ability to "fine tune" effectively over a short period of (say) two years.1

It is worthwhile to consider, very briefly, the underlying assumptions about the U.K. economy which, it seems, the authorities must hold if they are to justify their apparent concern with "fine tuning".

In the first place since "fine tuning" is essentially aimed at short-term stabilisation, the authorities must be assuming that:

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1 This is the typical definition of the short-period for policy purposes. Cf. H. M. Treasury (6), p. 31.

---

** I am indebted to Professor I. P. Peaslee and Dr. A. R. Nobay for helpful criticisms of this paper and to Mr. Wyne Godley for indicating passages in which either my interpretation of the CETF position or my emphasis was inappropriate. None of these gentlemen has, however, any responsibility for the paper as it stands. In particular any errors of analysis or interpretation are my own alone. Other comments on the "New Cambridge Macroeconomics" are listed in the Bibliography.
1. Discretionary fiscal action has:
   (a) a rather short average (outside) lag
   which (b) is itself stable,
   for, if this were not so, discretionary action would either have
   continuing and possibly increasing consequences in later periods which,
   for their avoidance, would necessitate the reversal of fiscal policies
   and thus instrument instability: or, alternatively its consequences
   would have an unpredictable time form.

   In the second place, since policy is discretionary and not based
   upon some control type rule, the authorities must be assuming that:

2. They have sufficient knowledge of the economic system
   to make reasonably reliable forecasts (over the typical short period)
   of the main components in aggregate demand.

   Clearly if 2 does not hold, the satisfaction of 1 cannot, by itself,
   justify any attempt at discretionary stabilisation let alone “fine
   tuning”. On the other hand if 1 does hold but forecasting ability is
   lacking, it should be possible to define stabilisation “rules” which,
   conceptually, are similar to control devices inserted into the system
   to ensure adequately “fine” tuning by built in responses.

   Finally the authorities must assume that there are major elements
   affecting demand, other than the expenditures and tax revenues of
   government itself, which are subject to significant fluctuations. In
   short they must assume that:

3. The private sector and/or the foreign sector are the typical
   sources of fluctuations in aggregate demand

   and 4. That any such fluctuations, though not necessarily
   explosive, are nevertheless likely to persist and grow after the elapse of one
   short period.

Clearly unless the authorities accept 3, discretionary action to
control demand for stabilisation purposes is indefensible since the
only conceivable source of fluctuations within the economy would be
the actions of the authorities themselves. Additionally it seems
necessary to assume that, where fluctuations do occur, they are

2 “Possible” here means “technically possible.” What is politically feasible is
another problem. It should also be noted that even if 2 is not satisfied, political pressure
may compel the authorities to attempt “fine tuning” even if they are themselves not
confident of their forecasting ability.

sufficiently long in duration and of sufficient amplitude to justify
attempts to offset them. It does not appear necessary to assume that
the private and foreign sectors would, in the absence of intervention,
be unstable, that is explode, in order to defend stabilisation. On the
other hand, if fluctuations in these sectors are typically minor and/or
are completed within a single “short period,” discretionary interven-
tion is otiose.

If we are correct in asserting that these four assumptions constitute
the essential basis of the “conventional macro-economic wisdom”
any attack on the “conventional wisdom” must attack one or more
of them. This means presenting evidence and not simply assertions
that one or more of them is incorrect. And this evidence must be at
least as strong as any evidence which can be presented in defence
of the approach which we have, we hope with justice, imputed to
the authorities. This in turn means that any critique of the conduct
of British macro-economic policy must consist in denying the validity
of the authorities’ view of the economic system — that is the
authorities’ model — and offering an alternative and, by presumption,
superior model in its place.¹

These requirements, though obvious, are worth stressing. A
critique cannot simply rest upon the assertion that some policies have
failed or some forecasts proved to be in serious error. Nor can it rely
upon some simple correlation between events to display a causal
connection even though this is a commonly accepted practice in
political disputes. These points are worth stressing because contem-
porary critiques of British macro-economic policy are being made
over a period (1974-6) in which there is (reasonably enough) a
general and growing dissatisfaction with British economic perfor-
ma and thus (less reasonably) an emotional, if not an intellectual,
predisposition to condemn the macroeconomic policy making which,
inter alia, this unacceptable performance reflects.

Conversely it is essential that serious critiques of British macro-
economic policy making should be given an unprejudiced and
careful review. This paper seeks to make a modest contribution to
this process by examining, in as much detail as possible, one such
temporary critique namely that put forward by the Cambridge
Economic Policy Group (CEPG) which has come to be called the
“New Cambridge Macroeconomics”. There is at least one good
reason for thinking such an attempt worth undertaking. This is that though the "new Cambridge Macroeconomics" undoubtedly exists, no formal exposition of its complete model has yet been published. In identifying the CEPG view it is therefore necessary to go to a number of different publications and then, in some measure, to draw inferences which may or may not be acceptable to the CEPG and its supporters. This risk of misinterpretation is unfortunate and will doubtless be eliminated before long by publication of the CEPG's formal model. Until then, there may be some value in an attempted synthesis — however tentative it must be — for it is only by providing something of the sort that we shall avoid an ad hoc, and thus generally, unconvincing discussion.

II

The CEPG position on economic policy constitutes an extremely comprehensive attack on the conventional wisdom. Though this attack is slightly differently expressed in different publications it is clear that the CEPG:

(a) explicitly deny proposition 3 which also constitutes a denial of proposition 4;

and (b) explicitly deny proposition 2;

and may, though this is, in the absence of a more complete statement of the full CEPG model, uncertain, also deny proposition 1. Thus three out of the four basic assumptions of the conventional wisdom are attacked. It is clear, however, that the fundamental element in the CEPG position is the denial of proposition 3: that is the assumption that the private and/or the foreign sectors are typically the sources of exogenous fluctuations in aggregate demand. As we have seen, if this denial is correct, the case against "fine tuning" is unassailable for the excellent reason that there are no fluctuations originating in the private or foreign sectors to offset. It also follows that, since aggregate demand in the U.K. has fluctuated with con-

sequential fluctuations in the rate of growth of output and the incidence of unemployment, these fluctuations must have been due, generally if not invariably, to the authorities own attempts at "fine tuning". Thus far from reducing fluctuations, the authorities in their misguided attempts at "fine tuning" have generated entirely unnecessary fluctuations. And this has come about precisely because they have the "wrong" macroeconomic model, that is one which is compatible with propositions 3 and 4 instead of the "right" model which, of course, according to the CEPG, is not.

Now it is entirely possible that this central CEPG criticism is correct. If it is, then there is a further implication. This is that many fiscal decisions which have typically been taken in the past primarily on the basis of the requirements of "fine tuning" must now be determined on some new principle. The CEPG puts forward a suggested "rule" for this purpose.

Purely as a matter of simplifying nomenclature, we shall call the CEPG proposition which is the basis of their attack on proposition 3, Godley's Law. Analogously we shall call the fiscal "rule" proposed by the CEPG, Godley's Rule. Since the latter is a consequence of the former in the CEPG proposals, we begin by examining Godley's Law.

III

There is, in the CEPG statements, no single precise formulation of the proposition we have called (purely for convenience) Godley's Law. Rather there are a number of statements which, though broadly very similar, differ in detail and, in particular, seem to imply different levels of aggregation.

For example we read,

"The proposition that private expenditure as a whole depends upon private income as a whole." This is one expression of the relationship. A second, and perhaps more precise formulation is:

"The private sector's net acquisition of financial assets (that is to say the excess of its disposable income over total expenditure on

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4 The sources consulted in order to attempt the synthesis are (1)-(2) in the list of references together with (16). Some of the points made here can be found in (2), (4), (5) and (6).

5 Carris et al (3); pass p 35. p. 1.

6 Or for the reason noted in footnote 2 above.

7 This notion does not imply that the CEPG analysis is solely due to Mr. Godley. A number of other Cambridge economists are known to have participated in the development of the CEPG ideas.

8 Carris et al (3); pass p 35. p. 5.
goods and services including investment) is likely to be fairly small and predictable.9

The second formulation is further developed in the same paragraph of the same publication as follows:

Private net acquisition of financial assets (NAFA) in each period is likely, it is suggested, to be determined by the level of real income after tax in that period, by the change in real income after tax (since the full response of expenditure to higher or lower income will probably not occur immediately) and by the availability to the private sector of certain kinds of credit.10

Consider now the first two statements. Define private expenditure in real terms as:

\[ E_r = C_r + I_r + L_r \]

where \( E_r \) is real planned private expenditure,

\( C_r \) is real planned consumption,

\( I_r \) is real planned investment in fixed capital,

\( L_r \) is real planned investment in inventories.

Godley’s Law, interpreted as a behavioural relation and neglecting dynamics, might then be written:

\[ E_r = f(Y_r - T_r) \]

where

\[ Y_r - T_r \equiv \text{real disposable income of the private sector, or, in linear form} \]

\[ E_r = c^* + c_1 [Y_r - T_r] \quad \ldots \quad (G.1) \]

Since NAFA \( \equiv Y_r - T_r - E_r \) and is stated to be “fairly small and predictable” we have

\[ \text{NAFA} = -c^* + (1 - c_1) [Y_r - T_r] \quad \ldots \quad (G.2) \]

which implies that

\[ c^* \approx 0 \]

\[ c_1 \approx 1 \]

Notice that in this formulation there is no mention of borrowing. In practice, borrowing is interpreted as consisting in \( \Delta HP \equiv \) the increase in hire purchase lending to the personal sector and \( \Delta BA \equiv \) the increase in bank advances to the personal sector. Since banks and finance houses are elements of the private sector when widely defined, we can interpret (G.1) and (G.2) as static versions of Godley’s Law when the definition of the private sector includes banks and non-bank financial institutions for in this case financial transactions between elements of the private sector disappear on aggregation. Hence \( \Delta HP \) and \( \Delta BA \) are identically zero. On this interpretation the implied definition of NAFA is given by:

\[ \text{NAFA} \equiv \text{net acquisition per period by the private sector of public sector liabilities both marketable and non-marketable.} \]

Retaining the same level of aggregation and introducing the dynamics of the third quotation we have:

\[ \text{NAFA}(t) = h^r + h_1 [Y_r(t) - T_r(t)] + h_2 [Y_r(t) - T_r(t-1)] \quad \ldots \quad (G.3) \]

with \( h^r \approx 0 \) and \( h_1 + h_2 \approx 0 \) since NAFA is small in equilibrium.

Moreover, since NAFA is “predictable” then, by implication, (G.3) is stable. Hence it is obvious that the corresponding expenditure function, the “dynamic” version of (G.1), is also stable.

Now consider the implications of the second part of the third formulation which introduced “the availability to the private sector of certain forms of credit”11 — in practice \( \Delta HP \) and \( \Delta BA \). This implies an expenditure function of the form:12

\[ E_r(t) = c^* + c_1 [Y_r(t) - T_r(t)] + c_2 [Y_r(t) - T_r(t-1)] + c_3 \Delta HP(t) + c_4 \Delta BA(t) + c_5 \Delta S(t) \quad \ldots \quad (G.4) \]

Here the private sector seems to be defined less comprehensively — indeed simply as the personal sector plus the company sector. Hence transactions with financial institutions are not eliminated by the aggregation process. Accordingly \( E_r \) is defined to exclude expenditures by the financial sector and there must be a corresponding redefinition of NAFA. The inclusion of \( \Delta S(t) \) changes in the

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10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
book value of stocks and work in progress is explained by the belief that changes in stocks generate, more or less automatically, net borrowing. A function of the form of (G.4) has been estimated by the CEPR using annual data for the years 1954-1972. These estimates which are reported in (4) suggest that \( e'_2 + e'_3 = 1 \) while \( e'_4 \) and \( e'_5 \) are also not significantly different from unity.\(^{13}\)

For the moment let us exclude all consideration of the methods used to estimate (G.4) and accept the quoted result as being reliable (in the sense of permitting forecasts of \( E_t \) at least as good as can be obtained by any other means) and enquire into the implications of (G.4). According to the CEPR the implications are quite devastating to the "conventional wisdom". For they assert:

"The proposition that private expenditure as a whole is dependent on private income as a whole necessarily implies that no component of private expenditure exerts an independent ('exogenous') net influence on the level of output or fluctuations in it."\(^{14}\)

This statement is certainly correct. It is, however, inapplicable to (G.4) since, in the absence of any theoretical explanation of \( \Delta HP(t) \), \( \Delta BA(t) \) and \( \Delta S(t) \) these must be treated as exogenous variables generated within the "extended" private sector. In so far as they are considered in this way, then it becomes a question of fact how far fluctuations in \( E_t \) are to be explained in terms of \( \Delta HP, \Delta BA \) and \( \Delta S \). This is a matter which requires econometric investigation.\(^{15}\) Casual empiricism suggests that their contribution has been quite considerable. It is, in fact, (G.3) rather than (G.4) which is compatible with the statement in the text and (G.3) is a relation we have inferred from qualitative CEPR statements not one put forward or investigated econometrically by the Cambridge group.\(^{16}\) In order to make the quoted claim compatible with (G.4) it must be argued that:

(i) the monetary authority can and does control \( \Delta HP \) and \( \Delta BA \) within very narrow limits; and

(ii) \( \Delta S \) can itself be made endogenous — possibly by introducing some accelerator hypothesis of the form

\[
\Delta S(t) = \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \Delta Y(t-i)
\]

\(^{13}\) Loc. cit.


\(^{15}\) The point has been examined by BISPELL (1); p. 46; Chart 2.

\(^{16}\) At least in published work.

If this can be done then it becomes clear that the only exogenous variables other than lagged terms entering into the determination of output will either be:

1. directly under the authorities control (the fiscal instruments)
2. indirectly under the authorities control (\( \Delta HP \) and \( \Delta BA \))
3. variables determined in the foreign sector typically:
   a. export demand, and
   b. the terms of trade.

In these circumstances, provided the stock accelerator hypothesis (assuming its introduction) is not such as, when combined with the dynamic multiplier, to give rise to oscillations (in response to stochastic shocks in private expenditure) of unacceptable amplitude and of a periodicity greater than two years, it is possible to accept the CEPR conclusion that, given (G.4)

"the only potentially destabilising influences are the Government's own actions with regard to expenditure, taxation and credit on the one hand and, on the other, foreign influences, particularly export demand and world commodity prices".\(^{17}\)

The CEPR then argues that typically (though purely by chance) "fluctuations in world trade have generated very little disturbance either to the U.K. balance of payments or real output in total".\(^{18}\)

The final indictment of the conventional wisdom follows immediately in the statement that

"...the observed fluctuations in U.K. output have, to this extent, been entirely the consequence of the stabilisation measures".\(^{19}\)

Very clearly Godley's Law, even if empirically reliable, does not, at least in the form of (G.4), justify the extremely comprehensive denunciation of the conventional approach to macro economic management which we have quoted. This conclusion can only be reached by:

(a) making a rather special assumption about the technical (short-term) efficiency of monetary policy which many would not accept;

\(^{17}\) GODLEY et al (3); para 15: p. 5.

\(^{18}\) (2) para 16-17: p. 5.

\(^{19}\) Loc. cit.
(b) assuming that some appropriate (but unexplained and unidentified) hypothesis can be introduced (with empirical support) to endogenise $\Delta S$ without, at the same time, modifying the dynamics of the system in a way which would prevent a case for discretionary "fine tuning"; and

(c) assuming that the "good fortune" which has, with some exceptions, apparently minimised the impact of external fluctuations will typically continue to do so.\(^{20}\)

The CEGP offers no evidence regarding (a) or (b) while, in the light of the commodity price boom of 1973 and the oil price rises of 1974-5, it would surely be optimistic to the point of folly to accept (c). In short, Godley's Law, in the form of (G.4), simply cannot by itself sustain the policy conclusions that the CEGP wish to derive from it even if further econometric investigation confirms the CEGP results.

Thus far we have been concerned with the validity of the general CEGP critique of the "conventional wisdom" on the assumption that Godley's Law holds. And, if our arguments are correct, the general conclusion is that Godley's Law must be supported by additional assumptions for which the CEGP provide no supporting evidence. This supporting evidence must come from some (more) complete CEGP macro-theory and the quantitative estimates of its behavioural functions. So far, as we have pointed out, neither piece of information is available in published form. It therefore seems useful to enquire into the relationship between Godley's Law, the aggregation process it seems to imply, and what may be called "conventional macroeconomic theory".

IV

Consider now some of the more obvious implications of:

(i) accepting (G.4) and

(ii) aggregating over the whole private sector defining this to include both banks and non-bank financial intermediaries. We have, in nominal terms:

$$E(t) = e[T - T, + e[T - T]_{t-1} + e\Delta S(t) \quad \ldots \quad (G.5a)$$

\(^{20}\) It should be noted that the CEGP view is that external revisions probably do not constitute a justification for discretionary fiscal intervention. Cf. (g) para 79. The argument, however, is not necessary symmetric.

and

$$NAF(t) = (1 - e)[Y - T] - e[S(t - 1) + e\Delta S(t)] \quad \ldots \quad (G.5b)$$

Godley's Law asserts that $e + e + e = 1$ to a close approximation. Either relation can then be put into first difference form. For example:

$$NAF(t) = e\Delta (Y - T) - e\Delta S(t) \quad \ldots \quad (G.6)$$

Suppose now that $\Delta S(t)$ has an unambiguous behavioural interpretation (we shall return to this point shortly). Then we can interpret $NAF(t)$ in a partial adjustment context, as being given by:

$$FA(t) = FA(t - 1) = \lambda [FA* - FA(t - 1)] \quad \ldots \quad (G.7)$$

$$\lambda [FA* - FA(t - 1)] + \lambda [FA* - FA(t - 1)]$$

where $FA \equiv$ public sector liabilities held by the private sector

$$FA* \equiv$$ long-run demand for public sector securities by the private sector.

Clearly (G.6) is a special case of (G.7) in which

$$\lambda = 1$$

the (market adjusts fully within the period)

$$FA* - FA(t - 1) = 0$$

for all values of $t$: that is the private sector's actual and preferred holdings always coincide.

$$FA* \equiv e(T - T) - eS(t) \quad \ldots \quad (G.8)$$

where $S(t) \equiv$ value of private sector's stocks.

This, however, assumes that $\Delta S(t)$ has an unambiguous behavioural meaning. According to the CEGP $\Delta S$ is defined as the change in the value of stocks. Accordingly,

$$\Delta S(t) = p(t)[S(t) - S(t - 1)] + p(t)S(t - 1)$$

$$\Delta S(t) \equiv p(t) - p(t - 1)$$

$$S(t) \equiv volume \ of \ stocks$$

$$p(t) \equiv [S(t) - S(t - 1) + S(t - 1 - S(t))] + \Delta S(t)$$

$$S(t) \equiv [p(t) - p(t - 1)] = \Delta S(t) + S(t - 1 - p(t) + U$$
where \( U \equiv p(t)[S_t - S_{t-1} + S_{t-1} - s(t)] \)
\( \equiv \) unanticipated stock changes + unanticipated stock revaluation
\( \Delta S_t \equiv \) planned increases in real stocks
\( S_{t-1} - s(t) \equiv \) anticipated stock appreciation.

It thus seems to follow that a strictly behavioural interpretation of (G.6) implies that \( U = 0 \) for all \( t \). And this implies that
(i) aggregate demand is always equal to aggregate supply
(no output lag); and also that
(ii) inflationary expectations are always correct to a close approximation.

Given these, we may write (G.6) as a genuine private sector flow demand. To make this clear we write:

\[ \text{NAFA}^p(t) = c_y Y - T - c_s \Delta S(t) \quad \cdots \text{(G.6)} \]

The next step, in logic, is to "endogenise" \( \Delta S(t) \). Since our argument is only illustrative we do this by assuming:
(iii) \( p(t) = \text{zero} = \bar{p}(t) \), and
(iv) \( \Delta S(t) = v[Y(t) - Y(t - 1)] \) \quad \cdots \text{(G.9)}

Plainly (G.9) itself entails additional assumptions but since the purpose of (G.9) is only illustrative and they can be shown not to be crucial, this need not detain us.

We also assume, as the CEPG do in at least one exposition,\(^{22}\) that

\[ T(t) = Y(t) \quad \cdots \text{(G.10)} \]

This gives

\[ \text{NAFA}^p(t) = [c_x(t - 1) - c_{Sv}] \Delta Y(t) \quad \cdots \text{(G.11)} \]

or, from (G.8)

\[ \text{FA}^p(t) = \text{FA}(t) = [c_x(t - 1) - c_{Sv}] Y(t) \quad \cdots \text{(G.8.1)} \]

These two equations give the planned flow demand (G.11) and stock demand (G.8.1) by the private sector for the liabilities of the public sector on the assumptions (and their implications) already listed.

Consider for a moment (G.8.1). Recalling that what this explains is the value of public sector liabilities demanded as a function of money income, (G.8.1) looks like a quantity theory demand function with the "New Cambridge" modifications that:

(i) the variable demanded is no longer defined as "money"
   in any one of its familiar forms but as public sector debt whether
   bearing nominal interest or not or whether marketable or not;

(ii) the quantity demanded is now a function of tax rates; and

(iii) the quantity demanded is no longer a function of interest rates.

The precise meaning to be attached to (iii) is not completely clear.

"The" rate of return on public sector liabilities does not enter the demand function. This seems to imply that the private sector is quite indifferent regarding the characteristics of the public debt. Though a single equation is not a model, it is somewhat surprising that, if this interpretation of the CEPG equation is correct, no mention is made of the nominal rate on public bonds or how it is determined.\(^{23}\) We must assume that, although the rate is the inverse of the bond price, the rate structure is not systematically related to debt composition. If this is what the CEPG means, then it completes the jettisoning of monitory theory already implied in the elimination, by aggregation, of lending within the private sector. For now, from (G.8.1) open market operations exert no influence on the system nor, of course, does debt policy. Instead we have a Quantity Theory of Public Sector Debt.

Let us now return to (G.11) and enquire how this relation can be used in a market equilibrium condition.

\[^{22}\text{Typically constant terms of trade and invariance in the ratio of export prices to home traded goods.}\]
\[^{23}\text{See Appendix, Equation (5).} \quad \text{p} \quad 7.\]
If we assume for convenience that the private sector does not borrow from/lend to the foreign sector and interest rates are constant, then equilibrium in the market for public sector debt entails that: 26

\[ NAFA^p(t) = \tilde{G}(t) - \tilde{T}(t) - L^f(t) \]  \hspace{1cm} (G.12)

where \( \tilde{G}(t) \) = nominal value of planned public sector expenditure
\( \tilde{T}(t) \) = nominal value of planned public sector taxation
\( L^f(t) \) = nominal value of planned purchases of additional public sector debt by the foreign sector.

We would expect \( \tilde{G}(t) - \tilde{T}(t) \), given the authorities' policy of "fine tuning" to be functionally related to:

(a) the authorities' utility function;
(b) the target values of the variables entering the utility function as arguments; and
(c) the authorities' model.

That is we must expect \( \tilde{G}(t) \) and \( \tilde{T}(t) \) to be derived from some fiscal policy reaction function.

The theory underlying \( L^f(t) \) is not discussed by the CEPG. Nor can it be considered here. However some theory is necessary to explain \( L^f(t) \). If, however, \( \tilde{G}(t) \), \( \tilde{T}(t) \) and \( L^f(t) \) are not themselves functions of \( Y(t) \) then (G.12) will permit us to determine current money income given \( Y(t-1) \) and the parameters of (G.11). This theory, if it is indeed the theory of the CEPG, is nowhere clearly exposed. Nor is there any discussion of either the fiscal reaction functions or the \( L^f(t) \) function. Nevertheless some such process of money income determination seems to be implied by Godley's Law. Moreover, if (G.12) (given the level of simplification) is a proper representation of the process of income determination, then it is clear that econometric investigations of (G.11) should strictly be conditional on some functional explanations of \( \tilde{G}, \tilde{T} \) and \( L^f \).

In practice, however, the CEPG do not offer (G.12) as a means of determining either money or real income. Instead they put forward a familiar multiplier formula. 26 We now, very briefly, examine the assumptions which seem to be necessary to move from (G.12) to a CEPG type result.

The first of these is that:

\[ L^f(t) = I - E(t) \]  \hspace{1cm} (G.13)

The second is that imports are explained by some simple function of income or disposable income, let us say

\[ M(t) = mY(t) \]  \hspace{1cm} (G.14)

Exports are exogenous;
\[ E(t) = \bar{E}(t) \]  \hspace{1cm} (G.15)

and
\[ \tilde{G}(t) = \bar{G}(t) \]  \hspace{1cm} (G.16)

that is public sector expenditure is exogenous. And, finally

\[ \tilde{T}(t) = c \cdot \tilde{Y}(t) \]  \hspace{1cm} (G.17)

which states that planned revenues are determined by the tax function and the level of \( \tilde{Y}(t) \) expected by the authorities.

Substituting (G.10), (G.12) — (G.15) into (G.11) yields

\[ Y(t) \left[ c(t-1) - cv + t + m \right] = \tilde{G}(t) - t \cdot \left[ \tilde{Y} - \bar{Y}(t) \right] - \bar{E}(t) \]

\[ + \left[ c(t-1) - cv \right] \tilde{Y}(t-1) \]  \hspace{1cm} (G.18)

where \( \tilde{Y} - \bar{Y}(t) \) is the error of the authorities' expectations of \( Y(t) \).

From (G.10) we can obtain the usual "impact" and "equilibrium" multipliers. These are for the exogenous variables \( \bar{G} \) and \( \bar{E} \).

\[ K^I = \frac{t}{c(t-1) - cv + t + m} = \text{impact multiplier} \]  \hspace{1cm} (G.19)

\[ K^e = \frac{t}{c(t-1) - cv + t + m} = \text{equilibrium multiplier} \]  \hspace{1cm} (G.20)

These are, of course, simple constant interest rate multipliers which reflect all the assumptions already stated and, in particular,
the assumption of overall balance in the autonomous items on external account.

If import plans are carried out then the only possibility of disequilibrium in this system appears to be \( \dot{Y} - Y \). Since the authorities apparently do nothing even if \( Y \neq Y \) (we have not specified their reaction to forecasting errors) we might as well think of a system in which \( \dot{Y} - Y = 0 \) for all \( t \). Such a system has very limited dynamics since the implications of Godley's Law appear to be that \textit{ex ante} and \textit{ex post} continuously coincide everywhere.

Clearly, from (G.20) the equilibrium relationship between increases in the public sector deficit and the current balance is one of equivalence. For, the change in the deficit is:

\[
\Delta G = \frac{t \Delta G}{t + m} = \frac{\Delta G \cdot m}{t + m} \quad \text{... (G.21)}
\]

which is obviously equal to the deterioration in the current balance. In the very short-run (one year) this equivalence does not hold. For the change in the deficit is:

\[
\Delta G = \frac{t \Delta G}{a + t + m} = \frac{\Delta G \cdot a + m}{a + t + m} = \Delta e(t = t) - e\nu \quad \text{... (G.20)}
\]

while the change in the current balance is

\[
m \Delta Y = \frac{m \Delta G}{a + t + m} \quad \text{... (G.22)}
\]

It is, we believe, the contention of the CEPG that fiscal policy should be based upon the acceptance of (G.21) and thus planned over a policy period in excess of two years. This, however, takes us on to the discussion of Godley's Rule.

We may conclude this brief inquiry as follows:

The acceptance of Godley's Law (on this interpretation) requires:

(a) the jettisoning of all monetary and financial theory;

(b) the acceptance of a number of special and restrictive assumptions;

(c) the acceptance that the multiplier/accelerator effects within the economy are completed in eight quarters.

It is, of course, trivially obvious that Godley's Law also permits the abandonment of all investment theories (except perhaps a very crude accelerator) and most theories of the consumption function.\(^{27}\)

No theoretical support is offered for Godley's Law. Thus, though if \( c_t = c_{t-1} \) (as we have assumed) the proposition is similar \textit{empirically} to applying Say's Law to the private sector, it is not similar \textit{theoretically}. This is because Say's Law does not consist in a claimed empirical regularity but in a set of propositions about a macroeconomic system and, in particular, about the workings of the capital market which imply continuous equilibrium in the goods market. The CEPG does not, however, discuss the capital market. Certainly it does not produce any argument to suggest that it is the prices/rates determined in the markets for financial and real assets which ensure that NAFA is "small and predictable."\(^{28}\)

V

In Section IV of this comment we have set out the assumptions which the acceptance of Godley's Law, as we have interpreted it, seems to imply. The italicized qualification is important since it is not, at present, clear that our interpretation is correct.

Our next task is to consider the case for Godley's Rule. This has two elements. The first is the contention that discretionary fiscal policy aimed at "fine tuning" is not only unnecessary but, in practice, harmful and therefore should be abandoned in favour of a policy aimed at "medium term" objectives. The second is the Rule defining the proposed "medium term" policy.\(^{29}\) These need to be considered separately.

The first proposal, the abandonment of "fine tuning", can, as we have seen, be sustained by combining the acceptance of Godley's

\(^{27}\) If Godley's Law holds then the acceptable theories of consumption and investment must generate results compatible with it. This must limit the class of investment and consumption theories (including their time forms) which is admissible. In forecasting aggregate demand, as opposed to its composition, consumption and investment theory can be neglected. It is a question of fact (yet to be investigated) which consumption and investment theories are, jointly, compatible with Godley's Law. Cf. (3) para B.\(^{27}\)

\(^{28}\) The development of a theory to explain why Godley's Law should hold is a task which will need to be attempted if the Law is to gain general acceptance.\(^{28}\)

Law with a number of additional assumptions. But the same proposal can be based upon other arguments. For example it can be argued that the "inside lag" of fiscal policy is too long for effective discretionary action. Alternatively it can be argued that the authorities' ability to forecast is too poor to permit effective discretionary action to be undertaken. Both propositions clearly require systematic evidence to sustain them. At some points the CEFG argues that the authorities' forecasting ability is defective but this is a technical issue which cannot easily be tested. Moreover, no systematic tests have yet been published by the CEFG. Hence the CEFG advocacy of a medium term fiscal "rule" does seem to derive, in large part, from its prior acceptance of Godley's Law rather than the alternative possibilities we have listed or the familiar observation that Britain's economic difficulties are structural rather than cyclical and hence that policy in general, and fiscal policy in particular, should be concerned with medium (or longer) term objectives rather than short run stabilisation. All this, of course, simply implies that we can, if we wish, accept the CEFG's proposal for a "medium term" fiscal rule without accepting the arguments which the CEFG deploys to support it. We can accept Godley's Rule even if we feel unconvinced about the wisdom of accepting Godley's Law.

What then is Godley's Rule? Put very imprecisely it appears to consist in the authorities selecting:

(i) a rate of expenditure on goods and services; and
(ii) a net withdrawals function
such that the planned Budget is in balance, to a close approximation, when the economy is operating at "full employment". Stated more succinctly Godley's Rule requires the "full employment" budget to be in balance.32

Suppose this is the case; then, at "full employment", there is no net borrowing by the authorities. Given Godley's Law, there will

be no net demand by the private sector for increased holdings of public sector debt. Hence, equilibrium in the public sector debt market, at full employment, requires a zero net flow demand by the foreign sector. That is:

\[ L' = \text{Imp. (F.E)} - \text{Exp. (F.E)} = 0 \]

Even if we continue to assume that \( L' = \text{Imports - Exports} \) there is no reason why, and no mechanism to ensure, that the current account balance will necessarily be zero at "full employment" output. The CEFG is perfectly aware of this and, indeed stresses the point.33 The Rule makes no claim to ensure overall equilibrium at full employment: it does, however, make possible overall equilibrium at full employment since, by definition, the goods and services will be available, at "full employment" output, to provide the necessary "full employment" value of exports. All that is required is for foreigners to be willing to buy them. It is, at this point, that the CEFG departs from what is, basically, a competitive equilibrium approach, to advocate the employment of quantitative restrictions on imports rather than exclusive reliance on exchange rate flexibility to manage the current balance.34

In this paper we are not concerned with the case for the introduction of import restrictions. We shall, therefore, ignore this important issue and examine a little further, the implication of Godley's Rule. Suppose that, in period \( t+j \), "full employment" output is, in real terms, expected to be \( Y(t+j) \). By the same token, prices are expected to be \( P(t+j) \). So that the expected value of "full employment" output is

\[ Y(t+j); P(t+j) \]

The withdrawal function relates Taxes — net of subsidies and transfer payments — to money income. So that,

\[ W = w(Y,p) \]

It thus follows that, for any withdrawal function implicit in fiscal legislation approved by Parliament, we shall have:

\[ W_{(t+j)} = W(Y_{(t+j)}) \]

30 This is not, in the view of this paper, the main element of the CEFG criticism though the CEFG do appear to argue that the company sector is, at present, inadequately modeled by the authorities. On this point cf. Caves et al (3) para 45, 39-40.


32 This simple statement clearly begs a number of awkward issues. Moreover, it should be made clear that the CEFG statement is not the rule, is by no means rigid. On this point the reader should consult the Minutes of Evidence in Report of the Select Committee and particularly (3) para 67-71. The Rule in this sense is a general recommendation to be taken into account — not a rigid requirement.

33 (40) p. 7-9.

34 (40) p. 9.
This expression gives net withdrawals (in money terms) at "full employment" in period $t+j$. We cannot, of course, since the British tax system is progressive, assume that (i) is homogeneous with respect to $p_t$ or $Y_t$.

Given (i), then Godley's Rule implies that the authorities should determine their expenditure on goods and services — in the short run — by this Rule.

$$G(t) = W^*_t f(p_{t+j})$$ for all $t$.

That is, independently of the level of output, actually ruling, the value of government expenditure on goods and services is set equal to net withdrawals at full employment. Clearly, if despite Godley's Law, there is still an output cycle, Godley's Rule will provide for some "built in" stabilization. Moreover if an external cycle occurs, say in exports, then, in its downswing exports fall, and the current balance goes into deficit. Since $I^*_t = \text{Imports} - \text{Exports}$ for all $t$, foreigners are prepared to finance this deficit. Given Godley's Law, in the private sector planned saving = planned investment at all levels of income. Hence $G(t) - T(t) = W^*_t f(p_{t+j}) - W(t)$ provides precisely the additional public sector debt that foreigners are wishing to purchase. This, of course, is an equilibrium argument that assumes that the income adjustment process is completed and the one-one relation between the public sector deficit and the current balance holds. Thus, in the short run, Godley's Rule entails some automatic or built in stabilization. Recessions will be accompanied by Budget deficits [since $W^*_t f(p_{t+j}) > W(t)$] which may be large. But, since $G(t)$ is now set by the (assumed invariant) value of $W^*_t$, these deficits (or surpluses) will be entirely induced. They result from the automatic operation of Godley's Rule. The authorities no longer exert any discretionary influence on demand. They have given up the use of one instrument — fiscal policy — and, correspondingly, must give up one policy objective: this is the control of the level of aggregate demand which is now, given Godley's Law, controlled entirely by foreigners.

We can now give a clear interpretation to the CEPIG argument that, to reduce the current account deficit it will be necessary to reduce the public sector's borrowing requirement (deficit).34

At its face value, this statement may mean one of two quite different things. The first is the suggestion that the tax and expenditure functions should be shifted so as to reduce the deficit at any level of output given present export levels. This would be a recommendation to add to the present recession a further element of fiscal deflation in order, via a further decline in domestic activity, to reduce imports. This is not the proper interpretation of the CEPIG position and this is hardly surprising since it is implicitly identical with asking for discretionary fiscal policy aimed at deflating demand.

The alternative interpretation of the CEPIG argument is that, on present policies, the CEPIG estimate that a public sector deficit would exist at full employment. If this is so, then clearly full employment and current account balance are incompatible. In these circumstances the correct policy is to move towards the position $G(t) = W^*_t f(p_t)$ as export demand rises with the recovery of world trade. It is this latter interpretation, which is consistent with our prior interpretation of both Godley's Law and Godley's Rule, which we believe correctly interprets the CEPIG position. If this is so, it does not seem open to criticism on grounds of logic. On the other hand, if we are correct, then the CEPIG can be criticised for failing to present its case clearly. In particular it would have made matters simpler had the CEPIG distinguished between:

(i) the observed public sector deficit;
(ii) the autonomous public sector deficit; and
(iii) the "full employment" public sector deficit.

Godley's Rule as we have presented it requires $G(t) = W^*_t f(p_t)$ for all $t$. Since $W$ is sure to be non-homogeneous in $p$ and $Y$, $W^*_t$ seems sure to increase as a proportion of $Y_t p_t$: that is in our rather over simple presentation, we have implied that the withdrawal function may remain unchanged over considerable periods of time. This is true only if long term policy is deliberately aimed at raising $W^*_t$ over time. If it is not, then the $W$ function will need to be shifted (by discretionary action) fairly frequently (perhaps yearly) to offset fiscal "drag".35 Thus, in practice, Godley's Rule does not imply

34 (as) p. 8 and (i) particularly para 64 p. 24.

35 This point has been made by others e.g. Wonnacott (p. 33). It is accepted by the CEPIG.
the absence of discretionary — and fairly frequent — tax changes. Hence it does not imply such a great increase in the stability of fiscal arrangements as might be supposed. On the other hand, assuming some approximate political consensus concerning the "acceptable" value of \( \frac{W_i}{p_i Y_i} \) at which policy should aim, the frequency and general direction of tax and/or transfer changes should be fairly predictable. Clearly in selecting this target value of \( \frac{W_i}{p_i Y_i} \) the authorities would, in the main, be concerned with longer run issues. Thus Godley's Rule does not eliminate the need for discretionary fiscal changes. It simply prohibits their use to manage demand. Instead they are to be used to ensure that \( \frac{W_i}{p_i Y_i} \) is some politically designated constant or is determined, for any \( t \), by some politically agreed trend.

Obviously enough, even given Godley's Law, Godley's Rule can be formulated to permit any form of variation in \( \frac{W_i}{p_i Y_i} \). Its fundamental element is only that \( G(t) = W_i(t) \). And, as we have already stated, it would be possible to support a "medium-long" term framework for fiscal planning, which might imply a target relation between \( G(t) \), \( W_i(t) \) without the suport of Godley's Law. It is, however, Godley's Law which requires \( G(t) \) to be maintained equal to \( W_i(t) \) and it is thus Godley's Law which underpins the CEPG argument concerning the need to cut this (full employment) borrowing requirement to restore the current balance.

As we have seen, under Godley's Rule, the observed public sector deficit will move anticyclically. If recessions are at all severe, the observed borrowing requirement might be large. If discretionary fiscal policy was anticyclical in operation as well as intent, it would, theoretically, lead to larger fluctuations in the observed borrowing requirements. On the other hand a discretionary fiscal policy superimposed on an externally generated cycle might well, if sufficiently ill timed, lead to smaller fluctuations in this observed borrowing requirement than the proposal we have identified as Godley's Rule.

VI

The purpose of this paper has been the limited one of exploring the implications of what, on our interpretation, is now known as the "New Cambridge Macroeconomics". If our interpretation is correct then, on the arguments of Sections III and IV, it appears that the "New Macroeconomics" implies a considerable number of assumptions not all of which are obviously acceptable.

There is, however, an alternative interpretation of the CEPG position for which it is possible to find some support in the Group's publications. This would restrict the CEPG to asserting that Godley's Law is simply an (inexplicable thus far on theoretical grounds but) observable relationship which is sufficiently reliable to constitute the best available means of forecasting private sector behaviour. Godley's Law thus becomes a forecasting device which, on the CEPG view, dominates other known methods of forecasting even though the latter (presumably) makes use of econometric models which are, in turn, derived from macro-economic theory.36 The implication of this is that economic theory, even supported by sophisticated econometric techniques, does, contemporaneously, no better and typically rather worse, than Godley's Law. Economists, in general, are likely to have a professional reluctance to accept this contention. Nevertheless it may well, as a matter of empirical fact, be correct. This shifts the argument away from examining the relationship between Godley's Law and received macro-theory and towards testing the empirical reliability of the relationship. To this issue, which is clearly of considerable importance for policy purposes, we hope to return in a later paper. In the meantime it would seem fair to conclude, provided of course that our interpretation of the CEPG position is correct, that the "New Cambridge Macroeconomics" does not, as yet, constitute a well developed theory and that the macro theoretical implications of Godley's Law are extremely formidable.

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36 Cf. Footnote 35. A fairer statement would probably be that CEPG thinks of Godley's Law as a useful constraint on forecasting systems and forecasts.
REFERENCES

7. G. D. N. Worswick, ibid., pp. 48-49.

World Market Instability in Primary Commodities

The world economy is still reeling from the remarkable increases in primary commodity prices in 1973-74 at rates and to levels that surpassed the early Korean War period. Even though many commodities have experienced price declines especially with the onset of recession in the industrialized countries in 1974-75, the question naturally arises as to what the future course of prices will be.

Some insights into this question can be obtained by examining the historical trend and cyclical movements of the prices of various commodities in the period since World War II. It is also interesting to consider the causes and consequences of instability and the economic policies that nations have designed to deal with instability and other aspects of primary commodities. In this regard, we shall take note especially of conflicts in commodity policies between commodity exporting and importing nations. In the course of our analysis, we shall offer some suggestions on further research that might enhance our understanding of the causes and consequences of instability and ways in which commodity-policy conflicts can be minimized.

Trend and Cyclical Movements in Primary Commodity Prices Since World War II

In order to determine how primary commodity prices have behaved in the period since World War II, we compiled annual price series for the major internationally traded commodities, based

* The data and technical notes on which this paper is based are available upon request from the author. Christopher P. Baum is to be thanked for his computational assistance.

1 For a comparison of these periods, see Mandeluk, M. "Commodity Prices during Two Booms: 1919 and 1953", Scandinavian Economic Review, 4/1974.